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Abstract 
In politics, representation in government is often thought of as the most salient means by 
which an oppressed class of people can improve their standing and raise themselves out of 
subjugation. The Reconstruction South featured a great influx of African-Americans into 
political office during the 1860s and 1870s, which allows us to question: did representation 
affect the material lives of black southerners after the Civil War? By wedding historical record 
and econometric analysis, I have found that there was largely little effect of black representation 
in government on black landownership and accumulation of wealth while there was a short-lived 
effect on income. During this period, many African-American officeholders sought to effect 
black landownership by increasing taxes on unused acreage within large plantations. Politicians 
decided against pursuing forced seizure of land to redistribute, and instead chose to incent 
landowners to sell their unused land. This economic incentive was meant to force a redistribution 
of land to poorer citizens. However, my analysis shows that this was not successful. Regression 
analysis shows a relationship between per capita county taxes in a county and a decrease in the 
number of large farms there. Yet, there is no demonstrable relationship between black political 
representation and black ownership of small, yeoman farms. Historical accounts indicate wealthy 
landowners as well as speculators from both the North and South purchased this land for their 
own means.  As this policy backfired, tenant farming and sharecropping became entrenched 
southern institutions preventing black accumulation of wealth and increasing profits for white 
landowners. In counties that had black political leadership, there was an effect of increasing rates 
of tenant farming over sharecropping through taxes. Though this represents an increase in 
incomes at the time, this income could not translate to sustained wealth. As modern black 
poverty largely stems from denial of wealth accumulation over centuries, these results help paint 
a broader picture of representation politics and their failure to tame systemic and market forces at 
play in American society.  
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I. Introduction 
Building a Black Political Consciousness 
Lack of access to political power holds many minority groups back from achieving 
sustained agency in American society. Once an oppressed class is represented in government, 
conventional wisdom believes, the barriers presented by white, male institutional hegemony 
can be undone. African Americans are one such group which has long suffered the ill effects 
of underrepresentation in government. Only within the last half-century have blacks held 
seats in Congress for a sustained period, and despite greater access to power institutional 
barriers persist. Following the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, there was a 
widespread belief that America had become a “post-racial” society. If blacks could attain 
political power at the highest level of government, what could explain the ever-present gap in 
black and white educational attainment, income, wealth, and health outcomes? Surely, there 
was little ground left to be gained politically. This paper concerns the power representation 
has demonstrated to alter America’s socioeconomic landscape for African Americans, if at 
all. The historical and statistical analysis herein centers around the very root of black political 
participation: Reconstruction. Government did not recognize African American citizenship 
nor voting rights until adoption of the 14th and 15th amendments in 1868 and 1870 
respectively. During and shortly after Reconstruction, America saw a large influx of African 
American politicians into public office across the South, though threats of violence and 
political chicanery forced almost all black politicians out of office by the nadir of American 
race relations in the 1890s. Utilizing this sample, analysis can understand how the first 
instance of representation can affect a class that had almost no assets and unclear legal 
definitions of rights as citizens. These politicians sought to lay the foundation for black 
prosperity in a new Union, and analysis allows insight into the role representation can play in 
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improving conditions for groups just gaining political power within long-established 
structures of government. 
Following the Civil War, the South was in major need of rebuilding and reform. All 
classes felt the pains of significant debt. The white planter class suffered intense loss of 
capital, seizure of land and the emancipation of their slave labor force by the victorious 
Union. Freed slaves, granted new agency in the Reconstruction South, had no assets and 
required government assistance to land on their feet.  Many slaves nearly immediately 
returned to their former owners to begin working the land for wage labor. Such conditions 
helped form the basis of the southern black political consciousness in the postwar years. The 
focus on the power of representation during Reconstruction is important because the ideals 
espoused by politically-involved freedmen worked to guide black political ideology well into 
the 20th century. Black politicians in office understood that they must create the conditions 
necessary not only for equal rights, but equal economic standing between black and white 
Americans in the new Union. For these reasons, out of myriad policy interest black 
politicians concerned themselves primarily with creating infrastructure for black education 
and black landownership. The former would ensure the potential for wage growth for African 
Americans as well as providing the tools to sustain a politically engaged black populace. The 
latter would act to cement economic class by creating a store of wealth which could be 
passed down across generations of future African Americans. The economic historical focus 
of this paper is of the effect of representation on wealth due to landowning’s importance in 
18th and 19th American legal definitions of citizenship, as well as wealth’s importance in 
understanding modern disparities in racial inequality.  
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Black Politicians of the Reconstruction South 
Of the blacks that held office during Reconstruction, relatively few were formerly 
enslaved. Instead, most were educated men who were free before the Civil War. In 
Reconstruction after the Civil War Franklin notes, “most of the Negro leaders were ministers. 
A fair number taught school. Some were employees of the Freedmen’s Bureau. Here and 
there one found a Negro who had been trained in law” (Franklin 89). Such an educated class 
of African Americans formed the caucus of leaders representing the interests of blacks at 
constitutional conventions and state legislatures across the South. Largely, these politicians 
formed policy positions less drawn along racial lines and more in favor of the empowerment 
of all economically ailing southerners, though radical positions were present among working 
class freedmen and some in government. 
Conciliatory politicians demonstrated the greatest political efficacy and developed 
postwar political consciousness into an ideological majority in Southern legislatures. This 
conciliatory faction reached across racial lines, with very little “vindictiveness in their words 
and their actions” (Franklin 90). Black leaders in Southern governments looked not to 
dominate the white class, but rather stand with them to improve the economic future of the 
region. In Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina black leaders sought to restore political 
rights to disenfranchised whites. This ranged from allowing rights to vote without 
representation to full political empowerment for those “who might aid in Reconstruction” 
(Franklin 90). In economic terms, this ideological group passed laws which meant to shelter 
impoverished and displaced whites as well as blacks. In Georgia and South Carolina, African 
Americans helped pass reforms to prevent the seizure of property from those unable to pay 
taxes and provide relief to capital-starved Southern banks. Politicians pursued these goals 
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knowing that the white community would benefit just as much as the black community. With 
similar regards to social relations, these conciliatory factions did not seek to undo white 
supremacy nor the caste system of the antebellum South. “It is false,” said P.B.S. Pinchback 
of Louisiana, “it is a wholesale falsehood to say that I wish to force ourselves upon white 
people” (Franklin 91).  
Despite adopting a palatable, even moral, policy tone in governing bodies black 
politicians of the South did not have an easy time making concessions with white politicians 
to benefit freedmen. Education, a key tenet of the Southern black political platform, would 
become a major source of tension between the warring racial groups. Both whites and blacks 
understood the power of free, public education for black children to chip away at white 
hegemony. For this reason, the white political and planter classes staunchly opposed public 
education, while agrarian classes welcomed education so long as schoolhouses were 
segregated. Despite Democrats’ fervor against educating blacks, each new state constitution 
provided for free education with the supporting coalition of black politicians, Northern 
Republicans serving in Southern state office, and “scalawag” native Southern republicans. 
The major source of contention then became segregation. Black leaders stood firmly on the 
side of mixed schools, seeing segregation as a violation of the 14th amendment and 
presuming – correctly – that segregation would lead to disproportionate funding between 
black and white schools. Tennessee, not subject to congressional reconstruction, passed laws 
supporting segregated schools in 1867. Alabama followed suit in 1868, allowing mixed 
schooling only with unanimous support of all involved children’s parents (Franklin 110-111). 
Even for those willing to make conciliations, the racism entrenched in Southern white 
politics presented a barrier for progressive, pro-black reforms. 
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Out of the nexus of black political consciousness during and after the Civil War emerged 
another, more radical faction of black politicians that sought to effect greater change with 
regards to black and white social, political, and economic relations. Black politics took root 
much quicker in urban centers and areas occupied by the Union opposed to much of the 
plantation South, with ideology wholly separate from more conciliatory black politicians in 
policy and tone. These blacks saw freedmen as an economically exploited class denied the 
fruits of their labor over centuries. Angry at the planter class for their reliance on “stolen 
labor”, ideological leaders of this faction refused to make concessions nor see blacks as “a 
race apart” like so many of their conciliatory colleagues (Foner 103, Franklin 91). Virginia’s 
constitutional convention was marked by a more radical tone from orators, with delegates 
changing the language of a public statement from “our former masters” to “our former 
oppressors” (Foner 115). More radical groups of black politicians had the greatest effect in 
Virginia, South Carolina, and Louisiana especially on the issues of universal suffrage and 
public discrimination (Hahn 208).  Black radicals along with radical white Republicans 
sought to remove property restrictions for voting and established voting without regard to 
“race, color, nationality, or previous condition” (Franklin 106). States with less black 
representation and more conciliatory politics saw less sweeping moves for suffrage. Georgia 
could not pass a measure that would have allowed all voters eligibility for public office, 
which soon led to the expulsion of African Americans from the state legislature (Franklin 
107). With regards to discrimination, the greatest strides were made in radical Louisiana. A 
major factor in the ideological makeup of Louisiana’s black politicians stemmed from its 
Constitutional Convention, which mandated 50% representation by blacks. Here, black 
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politicians successfully progressed towards equal access and mandated integration (Hahn 
210). 
The Land Question 
The differences between the conciliatory and radical factions of black politicians were no 
more pronounced than about the land question. Though both sides agreed that promoting 
black landownership was paramount to cementing black success long term, each sought 
different means of creating this landowning base for their constituents. Ultimately, black 
politicians chose against the more radical idea of land redistribution in favor of more 
conciliatory tax incentives for land sales. 
The idea of reparations for slavery, the mythical “forty acres and a mule”, began taking 
hold among slaves in the Confederate South during the war. Black troops which occupied 
white plantations spread the abolitionist notion of land redistribution as a means of solidarity 
and propaganda. “’The Negro Soldiery here,’ a Panola, Mississippi, landowner charged, ‘Are 
constantly telling our negroes that for the next year, the Government will give them land, 
provisions, and Stock and all things necessary to carry on business for themselves’” (Hahn 
133). Such a policy represented an inherently populist view, that those that had worked the 
land had the greatest right its ownership. “[Freedmen] contended that ‘the land ought to 
belong to the man who (alone) could work it.’ Most often, however, blacks insisted that their 
past labor entitled them to at least a portion of their owners’ estates” (Foner 105). Black 
politicians understood that not only was some recompense owed them for centuries of 
slavery, but that this compensation would secure generations of future African Americans 
with the starting capital necessary to succeed and maintain economic independence in the 
new Union (Foner 104). Though radical reconstruction helped deliver some major reforms to 
9 
 
states with larger black representation, radical land redistribution had very little traction in 
American government. Especially following Andrew Johnson’s ascendance to the presidency 
and his subsequent amnesty proclamation returning Freedmen’s bureau land to white 
planters, the conciliatory faction of black politicians needed a way to pass land reform. 
In the 1870s during Congressional Reconstruction, land taxation became the favored 
means by which a state could redirect unused land on large plantations to be sold to poorer 
farmers. “’I want to see the man who owns one or two thousand acres of land, taxed a dollar 
on the acre,” declared Abraham H. Galloway, “and if they can’t pay the taxes, sell their 
property to the highest bidder… then we negroes shall become land holders” (Foner 376). 
Much of the former Confederacy passed these taxes as a way of making unused acreage more 
unprofitable to the landowner. The incentive worked, with millions of acres entering the 
market across the South, most often in small lots as required by law. Yet, despite the success 
in driving this acreage to market, poor blacks could not acquire land. Resource-deprived 
freedmen had little economic power, and could not compete with large landowners or 
speculators for this land at auction. 
Though the historical record shows little success of these tax reforms in creating black 
wealth, the analysis herein will attempt to discern the specific effects of black political 
representation at the county level on wealth transfers within that county. Were blacks 
represented in government necessarily better off than their counterparts who were not? If 
there was no wealth effect of political representation, was there any effect at all? 
Contract Labor in the New Southern Economy 
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Following slavery, the economic model of the agrarian South shifted towards rental 
farming via the institutions of tenant and sharecropping. Freedmen faced numerous barriers 
to owning land, including a white class opposed to extending them credit or selling them 
land. This class would also rely on violence against the few black landowners to discourage 
black economic independence. As tax reforms failed to redistribute land to African 
Americans for these and myriad other reasons, freedmen had little choice except to sell their 
labor on the free market working others’ land. Eric Foner describes the transition from free 
labor to wage labor,  
The adjustment to a new social order in which their persons were removed from the 
market, but their labor was bought and sold like any other commodity, proved in many 
respects difficult. For it required abandonment of some traditions inherited from slavery 
and the adaptation of others to the logic of the economic market, where the impersonal 
laws of supply and demand and the balance of power between employer and employee, 
rather than custom, justice, or personal dependency, determines a laborer’s material 
circumstances (Foner 106). 
Left up to the market, the material circumstances for freedmen varied greatly between 
sharecropping and tenancy. Sharecropping entailed a split of the land’s yield between the 
farmer and the planter. The farmer typically sold what was left over from the split back to 
the planter at his store, where the farmer would purchase food, clothing, and seeds for the 
new season. When the farmer could not pay cash for these items, the planter would 
extend credit in the form of a crop lien to finance these oft-overpriced items which forced 
the farmer into vast amounts of debt. In contrast, tenancy represented a system which 
provided higher wages for farmers and encouraged investment into the land they farmed. 
Under tenancy, the farmer pays an agreed-upon cash rent to utilize the land and keeps all 
the land’s yield for himself. Tenancy was markedly different from sharecropping with 
regards to the everyday relations between laborer and planter. Under sharecropping, the 
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laborer was subject to near-constant supervision of his work. In Georgia, “planters 
employed ‘whipping same as in slavery’ without interference from civil authorities” 
(Foner 409). While sharecropping served to maintain the relations of slavery within a 
more liberal system of “voluntary” labor, the tenant farmer had almost no supervision of 
his labor by the planter.  
Sharecropping as an institution was more capital intensive than tenant farming, in that 
sharecropping planters owned more land, more machinery, and employed more laborers 
than a tenant planter. Under tenancy, the laborer would have to provide his own 
machinery for working the land and was largely less dependent on the resources of the 
planter. The use of crop liens at merchant shops to provide clothing, seeds, and other 
necessities to laborers on credit represents a major difference between sharecropping and 
tenancy. Often, a sharecropper was required under contract to only shop at one 
merchant’s store and could only use his crops as credit at that store. Sharecropping 
allowed the planter class to control every aspect of a black laborer’s economic activity in 
a system very much akin to antebellum chattel slavery. 
Though rental farming did not have the same potential for wealth creation and 
economic independence as landowning, tenancy generally represented a less exploitative 
form of labor than sharecropping. With this understanding, I then question: did counties 
with black political representation experience a positive income effect with regards to an 
increased prevalence of tenancy over sharecropping? 
II. Literature Review 
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Current literature surrounding the effects of representation in government on material 
benefits to oppressed groups presents both positive and negative results with regards to its 
efficacy, and social scientists have conducted little empirical research on the power of 
representation specifically during Reconstruction. Most research centers around 20th century 
impacts of representation primarily at local levels in the United States. Other papers consider 
international examples of representation, and generalizing these findings to the United States 
is tenuous. Little economic research examines representation in the United States prior to the 
Civil Rights Era, as there was a lack of minority representation in government from the 
1890s until then. By applying statistical analysis of representation to Reconstruction, this 
paper helps give context to modern questions of representation in the United States and 
contributes to the greater discourse of the power of representation removed from specific 
groups and time periods. 
 In Gridlock: Ethnic Diversity in Government and the Provision of Public Goods Beach 
and Jones found in 2017 that increased diversity on California city councils led to a reduction 
in public spending, against the interests of the poor and racial minorities. Particularly, when a 
non-modal candidate is elected to city council there is a 15% drop in expenditure on public 
goods. These findings support the theory by Alesina, Baqui, and Easterly (1999) that 
increased diversity in government leads to a reduction in spending because different racial 
groups have different preferences for spending, leading to policy gridlock. 
In Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership? The Case of U.S. Mayors Ferreira and 
Gyuorko found largely no difference in policies pursued by male or female mayors. The 
specific policies they examined included per capita tax revenues, total employment, 
expenditure on police, and effects on murder rates. There was no effect of female 
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representation on any of these outcomes. The authors attribute this result to the Median Voter 
Theorem, that regardless of who is in power as mayor he or she must answer to the policy 
positions of the median voter. In addition, researchers found that there was no result of 
female mayoral representation on further political empowerment of women. Following the 
election of a female mayor, there was no continued bias towards female political 
officeholding.  
In contrast to findings against positive impacts of political representation, in Can 
Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? 
Theory and Evidence from India Pande found that mandated representation of minority 
groups in Indian government led to increased transfers to these groups. Particularly, changes 
in leadership led to more targeted spending on minority education, job quotas, and welfare. 
The author is careful not to allow these findings to generalize to policy in the United States, 
however. The United States has experimented with mandated representation by redrawing 
political district lines, but these changes altered the identity of legislator and voter, which 
makes it hard to identify the unique effect of legislator identity as they will still answer to a 
median voter and not the specific needs of their minority group. 
In The Political Economy of Black Business Development: African American Urban 
Representation and Black Business Prosperity Hewitt, Brown, and Hodge found that cities 
with black mayors are more conducive to African American business development, with 
cities with black mayors demonstrating 114 more black owned businesses with paid 
employees while accounting for local income and population. There is also a positive effect 
of city council representation, with diminishing returns beyond 50% representation. Cities 
with black mayoral presence and black city council representation saw an increase of $9.6 
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million in economic activity from black businesses. This analysis provided a strong case for 
the importance of white-black coalition in government to more equitably provide access to 
political and economic power. As the researchers demonstrated diminishing returns to 
representation beyond 50%, coalition is more important than “subordination or 
superordination”. 
III. Dataset and Methodology 
Dataset 
The dataset for this analysis comes primarily from Eric Foner’s Freedom’s Lawmakers, 
considered the comprehensive guide to black politicians holding office during southern 
Reconstruction. Information from the book was copied over to a Microsoft Excel file and 
then translated into a Stata dataset for use in analysis. This dataset contains information on 
over 1,400 politicians during reconstruction, including branch and level of office, years 
entering and leaving office, as well as contextual information regarding property ownership, 
literacy, and other variables. Of the politicians in the book, minor positions such as 
policemen, constitutional convention delegates, and Republican club members were 
excluded. Although these politically involved individuals could help drive the formation of 
black ideology, they largely did not wield direct power over policy. As this analysis centers 
around tax rates, these individuals would have skewed results.  
Census data from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research 
provided contextual information at the county level, primarily for years 1870 and 1880. This 
dataset provided control variables for the multiple regression model used in Stata. These 
variables included county farm values, manufacturing output, manufacturing wages, 
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percentage black, total population in 1870, number illiterate, access to water infrastructure, 
access to rail infrastructure, and a dummy variable for indicating urban counties. Control 
variables made use of state fixed effects and the Logan and Parman measure of county 
segregation. Controlling for these factors when considering the effects of black politicians on 
taxes allows us to understand the unique effect of black politicians on taxes regardless of 
county level wealth or economic development. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Black Politicians in Foner’s Freedom’s Lawmakers 
For county-level distribution see Appendix Figure 1 
Empirical Model: Wealth 
The analysis here makes use of Ordinary Least Squares and a Two-Stage Least Squares 
regression model. To examine the effect of black politicians and the higher tax rates they 
enacted on wealth outcomes for black and poor southerners, the difference in number of 
small and large farms from 1880 to 1870 represented the dependent variable in both sets of 
regressions. For my purposes, a large farm is any farm over 100 acres and a small farm is any 
farm less than that in size. In the OLS model, the equation estimated for change in small 
farms was: 
𝛥𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 1880 − 1870𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖 
+𝛽2𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀  
States Represented AL AR DC FL GA LA MS NC SC TN TX VA
Count 152 46 10 54 106 207 220 179 309 20 45 84
Total 1432
Mean Year Entering Office 1870.0
Mean Year Leaving Office 1873.6
Proportion of Politicians Owned Property Born a Slave Victim of Violence Literate
46.72% 28.91% 10.47% 83.82%
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Where Xi is the vector of county-level control variables outlined above and Yj is a vector of 
binary state fixed effect dummy variables. The equation estimated for change in large farms 
was the same, but with 𝛥𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 1880 − 1870 as the dependent variable. 
 Because I hypothesize that there is an effect of black politicians on county taxes, there is 
a concern of multicollinearity between  𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in the OLS model. To account for this, a 
Two Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable model is also estimated. The first stage of 
this regression is thus: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖̂ =  𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 
+ 𝜋2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀  
The second stage regression is then: 
𝛥𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 1880 − 1870𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖̂  
+𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀  
In addition to alleviating collinearity concerns, this specification allows for the results to be 
conditioned on the unique effect of black politicians on taxes. By employing this model a 
more thorough understanding of the effects of black politicians can be established. The taxes 
levied by a black politician may have a different effect than taxes levied in counties not 
represented by black politicians solely because of differing policy priorities by race. Using 
the two-stage least squares model allows to regression to be run on an estimated taxation 
parameter, where this parameter is dependent upon the number of black politicians in a 
county. This allows the best understanding of how variations in political representation affect 
variations in taxation, and then how the unique tax effect of black politicians can affect 
material outcomes for freedmen in the South. 
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Empirical Model: Income 
To also examine the income effect on African Americans from black representation in 
politics, I make use of a similar model to examine the effect of representation on the 
distribution of tenant and sharecropping farms in the Reconstruction South. I make use of the 
same specifications from wealth effect regressions, except the dependent variable is now 
expressed as the ratio of tenant farms to all rental farms in 1880, denoted as: 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 =  
# 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦
# 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 + # 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦
 
 
Thus, the OLS model for this dependent variable is: 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖 
+𝛽2𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀  
I employ a similar Two Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable regression to reconcile 
multicollinearity between taxes and black politicians and to understand the unique effect of 
black politicians on taxes with the first stage: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖̂ =  𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 
+ 𝜋2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀 
With the following second stage model: 
𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 1870𝑖̂  
+𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑗 + 𝜀  
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Because of disparate policy goals by race, this model best allows for understanding the 
unique effect of black politicians on taxation and tenancy rates. Sharecropping, as opposed to 
tenant farming, particularly employed black laborers and as such the debt peonage and 
exploitation of the institution largely became a race-based issue. It is very likely that white 
politicians would not have had the same exposure to the issue, nor would they have sought 
policy to relieve such a burden specifically on freedmen. This model allows for per capita 
county taxes to be conditioned on black political representation which gives a more thorough 
insight into the efficacy of black policy as opposed to the general Republican platform of 
Reconstruction. 
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IV. Results 
Table 2: The Wealth Effect of Black Political Representation 
     
          
 
Large Farm 
Difference 
 Small Farm 
Difference 
 
          
OLS     
     
Per Capita County Taxes -20.02***  1.051  
 (7.248)  (9.624)  
          
 
Per Capita 
County Taxes    
     
First Stage     
     
Black Politicians per County 0.0933***    
 (0.0115)    
          
F-Statistic on Excluded Instrument 66.01       
 
Large Farm 
Difference 
 Small Farm 
Difference 
 
     
2SLS     
     
Per Capita County Taxes 3.483  50.11  
 (24.95)  (33.51)  
          
     
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
N= 692. All regressions include total value of farms in 1880, the Logan-Parman segregation  
measure, percent black, total population, manufacturing wages, value  
of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, state fixed effects, and urban county 
indicators.   
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From this output, there was no effect of black political representation on the distribution 
of small and large farms within the counties they represented. Beginning with the OLS 
regression, there is a significant result with regards to change in number of large farms. Each 
dollar increase in per capita taxes is correlated with a decrease of 20.02 large farms on 
average from 1870 to 1880, significant at the p < .01 level. For one standard deviation 
increase in per capita county taxes, there is a 4% decrease in the difference in large farms 
from 1880 to 1870, compared to the mean. There is no effect of taxes on the proliferation of 
small farms. This supports the historical analysis that shows many farms placed onto the 
market because of higher taxes on unused acreage were sold to other landed, white planters 
or Northern speculators instead of to poor Southerners and freedmen.  
 Moving to the two stage least squares result, we begin with the first stage results. These 
results indicate that each additional black representative per county is correlated with a 9.3 
cent increase in per capita county taxes, significant at the p < .01 level. The Cragg-Donald F-
Statistic on the excluded instrument, number of black politicians per county, is 66.01. The 
magnitude of this F-Statistic indicates that the instrument is very likely not weak. The second 
stage of the instrumental variable regression indicates no significant results for the effect of 
taxes on differences in small nor large farms from 1870 to 1880. 
 Examining these results in tandem indicates that there is an effect of taxes on decreasing 
the number of large farms per county, but when considering the unique tax policies presented 
by black political representation there is no effect. It is intuitive that higher taxes on property 
would decrease marginal returns on owning land, which the results reflect. Yet, based on the 
historical record one would assume that black politicians particularly had an interest in 
raising taxes on unused land. It may be the case that Republican ideology trumped black 
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identity politics in South. White and black representatives may have had similar tax policy 
goals, leading to no real effect of representative’s race on the efficacy of these taxes.  
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Table 3: The Income Effect of Black Political Representation 
 
 
     
          
 
Sharecrop Farms 
Tenant 
Farms 
Sharecrop - 
Tenant 
Farms 
Percentage of All Rental 
Farms that are Tenant Farms 
          
OLS     
     
Per Capita County Taxes -15.24* -11.45* -3.788 0.0131** 
 (8.638) (6.380) (9.650) (0.00543) 
          
 
Per Capita 
County Taxes    
     
First Stage     
     
Black Politicians per 
County 0.0933***    
 (0.0115)    
          
F-Statistic on Excluded 
Instrument 66.01       
 
Sharecrop Farms 
Tenant 
Farms 
Sharecrop - 
Tenant 
Farms 
Percentage of All Rental 
Farms that are Tenant Farms 
     
2SLS     
     
Per Capita County Taxes -4.410 170.7*** -175.1*** 0.0433** 
 (30.91) (32.37) (40.70) (0.0190) 
          
     
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
N= 829. All regressions include total value of farms in 1880, the Logan-Parman segregation  
measure, percent black, total population, manufacturing wages, value  
of manufacturing output, number illiterate, rail access, water access, state fixed effects, and 
urban county indicators.   
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From this output, there was an effect of black politicians on increasing the prevalence of 
tenant farms over sharecropping farms in the counties they represented. Beginning with the 
OLS model that examines the effect of taxes on the distribution of tenant and sharecropping 
farms, the only significant result is that each additional dollar of per capita taxes is correlated 
with a 1.31 percentage point increase in the proportion of tenant farms to all rental farms in a 
county. A one standard deviation increase in per capita county taxes is correlated with a 5.8% 
increase in the ratio of tenant farms to all contract farms, compared against the mean. There 
were no significant results for the effect of taxes on number of tenant farms, number of 
sharecrop farms, nor sharecrop farms minus tenant farms. However, as the coefficients on 
number of tenant farms and number of sharecrop farms are significant at a level of p < .1 it 
seems that the effect of taxation is biased towards reducing the number of rental farms on 
average. The OLS results from table 2 corroborate this, as taxation had an effect of reducing 
the number of large farms per county. Since Reconstruction era rental farms tended to be 
large, antebellum plantations broken up into smaller plots to be worked by wage laborers the 
tax effect of reducing the number of large farms would also lead to a reduction in these types 
of farms.  
The instrumental variable results make use of the same first stage as the wealth 
regressions. Utilizing this model allows the results to be conditioned on the unique tax effect 
of politicians as in the previous regression, which allows for a more accurate understanding 
of how counties with black politicians benefitted from such representation. The first result of 
interest is the increase on the coefficient for taxes for the proportion of tenant farms to all 
rental farms regression. Here, the change in proportion from a one dollar increase in per 
capita taxes rises from 1.31 percentage points to 4.33 percentage points. For a one standard 
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deviation increase in black politicians, there is an associated increase of 35 cents in per capita 
county taxes. From this increase in per capita county taxes, there is a 4.9% increase in the 
ratio of tenant farms to all contract farms, compared against the mean. From this output the 
sign change on the coefficient on taxes in the number of tenant farms regression is 
additionally of importance. From OLS to IV, the coefficient goes from -11.45 to 170.7 with 
the latter displaying significance at the p<.01 level. From these results, black politicians must 
have had some influence on the direction of tax policy to encourage a marginal improvement 
in black labor conditions. By focusing taxes specifically on unused acreage on plantations, 
Black politicians effectively raised the opportunity cost of holding undeveloped land. 
Although the purpose of these taxes was to encourage the sale of this land, it also had the 
effect of raising labor demand. If planters did not wish to sell the land, it became prudent to 
develop the acreage so that it could bear crops. With an increase in arable land came an 
increase in demand for labor to work this land. The South is notoriously land rich and labor 
poor, and to attract laborers it was natural for the planter class to adopt more favorable 
working conditions and higher wages for their laborers in the form of tenancy as opposed to 
sharecropping. The historical record shows that when confronted with labor shortages, 
planters were quick to respond with preferred treatment for laborers despite racial 
differences. During the immediate postwar labor shortage, Foner notes that “To attract 
laborers, many planters in 1866 and 1867 found it necessary to raise wages, promise 
additional pay for harvest work, and offer land free of charge for garden plots” (Foner 139). 
Even after the new South’s labor relations became more concrete, planters continued to 
respond to labor market pressures with higher wages and favorable conditions. During the 
1870s, black workers on Louisiana’s sugar plantations became one of the South’s best 
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compensated labor forces, “Blacks quickly became a wage-earning labor force, receiving 
daily or monthly wages considerably exceeding those elsewhere in the South, and enjoying… 
the traditional right to garden plots” (Foner 402). As Louisiana was one state which 
benefitted greatly from high numbers of politically involved African Americans, it is 
important to note that although general tax increases had an effect for preferring higher 
wages for blacks, when taxes are conditioned on the tax effect of black politicians the effect’s 
magnitude becomes much more stark. Black politicians had an ideology distinct from 
prevailing Republican policy points which focused on improving the conditions of the black 
working class, and these politicians understood that wealthy white planters were 
diametrically opposed to the advancement of black laborers. These results reflect that black 
politicians not only sought to increase taxes, but to direct these taxes to create favorable labor 
market conditions for economically disempowered freedmen. 
V. Conclusion and Discussion 
Implications for Representation Politics 
 Though African American politicians sought to create a landowning base for freedmen 
following the Civil War, the results of this analysis demonstrate that the conciliatory 
Republican line these politicians took was not successful in achieving this goal. Radical 
redistributive politics, eschewed to be more palatable to those of the white ruling class, never 
took hold in the Reconstruction South. Instead, politicians chose to work within the given 
system of government to pursue more liberal policy. Increased taxes on unused acreage did 
have the effect of altering how white planters treated their landholdings but could not undo 
greater economic and systemic forces at play in the post-bellum South. 
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 Following the Civil War all classes, including the landowning class of white plantation 
masters, felt the pains of severe debt. Much of America’s Black Belt suffered ruin at the 
hands of Union occupation. Foner notes, "In Dallas county, the heart of Alabama's plantation 
belt, whites' per capita wealth fell from $19,000 in 1860 to one-sixth that amount ten years 
later" (Foner 129). Though these conditions were favorable to creating wealth transfers 
between classes in the South, very few freedmen commanded enough wealth to be able to 
participate in such a market. Instead, white “carpetbaggers” of the industrial North were best 
able to take advantage of deflated land prices and the need for white southerners to begin 
acquiring the capital necessary to succeed in the new Union.  
"During and immediately after the war, a new element joined the South's planter class: 
Northerners who purchased land, leased plantations, or formed partnerships with 
Southern planters... Capital-starved businessmen welcomed their participation in 
commission houses, banks, and planting partnerships" (Foner 137).  
 
Of the plots of land going to auction, few plots fell into the hands of the black working class. 
Northern postwar prosperity instead allowed speculators and carpetbaggers to command the 
most economic power in the recovering South. In leaving the task of land redistribution up to 
existing markets, political representation could not have an effect of guiding the Invisible 
Hand to favor those with the least political and economic power. 
 Similarly, black political representation which arose largely through appointments by the 
federal government, could not alter the greater landscape of race relations in the postwar 
South. Following postwar emancipation, freedmen were not raised to a level of equality with 
whites of the same economic caste. Instead whites, both powerful and poor, viewed African 
Americans as a race wholly apart from their own. In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
there was considerable animosity between the races fueled largely by the unclear trajectory 
of labor relations during Reconstruction. Freedmen, determined to cement their economic 
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and social independence insisted on fair treatment by plantation owners which only 
heightened racial tensions. Foner recants one instance of freedmen building a public 
campaign against one former slave owner, "Howell Cobb's former slaves… have been busy 
spreading tales about [Cobb]'s overseers and trying to prevent new hands from coming to 
[the plantation]" (Foner 139). In the postwar South labor shortages forced plantation owners 
to make concessions to their former slaves, unseating any perceived power the planters once 
derived from their race. However, planters were quick to begin rebuilding white supremacy 
in the South and hinder substantial material gains by freedmen. W.E.B. Du Bois in Black 
Reconstruction discusses the use of violence during reconstruction to intimidate blacks and 
discourage actions towards racial equality. “The New Orleans riot of July 30, 1866, 
confirmed the Abolitionists in their opinion that the reconstructed states were in the power of 
the rebels… There were reported a thousand murders in the South, with few of the criminals 
brought to justice” (Du Bois 314). The resurgence of white identity politics transcended 
economic class, and led to substantial barriers to black landowning in the South. Freedmen 
faced a "white community united in the refusal to advance credit or sell them property" 
because of the resurgence in racism (Foner 106). Though planters had no choice but to 
respond to market conditions with favorable labor arrangements for black workers, they were 
incredibly successful in leveraging racism to prevent sustained advancement and wealth 
accumulation among the poorest African Americans. 
 This paper joins others in the literature that demonstrate an unclear impact of 
representation on the advancement of minority groups in the United States and abroad. 
Though black politicians could successfully create conditions for higher wages for black 
laborers in the counties they represented, they could not empower workers to become 
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economically independent landowners. As white supremacy surged in the South the white 
ruling class purged African Americans from government through coercion and legislation. 
By the nadir of race relations in the 1890s, any shreds economic and political equality 
between races quickly faded. The temporary beneficial effect of black political representation 
could not translate to sustained wealth for African Americans, leading to entrenched, 
systemic racial difference in the 20th and 21st centuries.  
The Effects of Failed Policy on Modern Black Wealth 
 
Because black politicians failed to redistribute land to freedmen, many could only turn to 
wage labor and contractual farming as a means of providing for themselves and their 
families. The exploitative systems of tenant and sharecropping prevented African Americans 
from saving and building wealth. Race relations deteriorated from the 1890s without 
improving until the mid-20th century, leaving blacks subject to violence, displacement, and 
redlining. In current economic literature and in popular discourse, there is a great focus on 
income inequality. Research demonstrates that black men earn 22 percent less than white 
men, but the income gap does not paint a broad enough picture of modern racial inequality 
(Wilson & Rogers 2016). Today, the median white family controls 12 times as much wealth 
as the median black family (Herring & Henderson 2016). Because the seeds of black 
landownership could not be planted during Reconstruction, African Americans experienced a 
multi-generational disadvantage compared to whites in building wealth that perpetuates 
structural inequalities in the modern era. 
To explain the racial wealth gap, those with political power tend to blame moral failings 
on the part of African Americans. “In an April lecture at Morehouse College, Federal 
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Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke attributed the racial wealth gap to a lack of ‘financial literacy’ 
on the part of blacks, particularly with respect to savings behavior” (Hamilton & Darity 
2009). Not only does research fail to show a lack of financial literacy on the part of African 
Americans, but much of the racial wealth gap can be explained by longstanding structural 
inequalities that have meant to maintain blacks’ disadvantaged position. Darity’s Lateral 
Mobility Hypothesis states that  
‘the relative social standing of the majority of the members of an ethnic group in their 
country of origin ... the highest social status attained by the adult generation that 
constitutes the bulk of the migrants’ will play a critical role in the social status achieved 
by their children and grandchildren in the receiving country”  
Darity expands upon this in Evidence in Support of the Intergenerational Drag Hypothesis, 
stating “Thus, individual ethnic immigrant histories point toward a consistent and systematic 
relationship between the relative class status of the group's members in past generations and 
the relative class position of descendants many years later”. Much of a group’s current 
standing can be explained based on their majority material position at the turn of the century. 
In Race, Wealth, and Intergenerational Poverty Hamilton and Darity note that, “Economic 
studies also demonstrate that inheritances, bequests, and intrafamily transfers account for 
more of the racial wealth gap than any other demographic and socioeconomic factor, 
including education, income, and household structure” (Hamilton & Darity 2009). From this 
understanding, clearly the role of contractual labor at the turn of the century cannot be 
ignored. Because laborers could not own the land they worked, that land could not be passed 
down to their offspring and future generations. Land represents a store of wealth which can 
be transferred in perpetuity within the family. The value of land rises over time, following 
inflation and economic development in surrounding communities, making it a relatively safe 
investment that holds its value. Land also can be used as collateral in securing debt financing 
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to improve the family’s economic standing by funding investments in land or in 
postsecondary education. As freedmen did not own land, they could have no legitimate 
claims to the land they upon which lived and worked, stripping them of the political power 
they held during Reconstruction.   
 Even following the Civil Rights era, blacks continue to feel the ill effects of this decades-
long denial of wealth. Segregated schooling may no longer be codified into law, but through 
the coercive effects of the ghettoization of black life and community, significant racial 
disparities in education persist. Most schools throughout the country receive funding via 
property taxes, and those taxes are linked to community wealth and land values. Past 
injustices continue to limit black achievement. Systemic inequality built up over generations 
could not be removed just through the repeal of Jim Crow, much like political representation 
during Reconstruction could not suddenly engender economic and social equality between 
whites and blacks following centuries of chattel slavery. Darity et al. conclude their paper on 
the Intergenerational Drag Hypothesis with the notion that a society exhibiting racial and 
ethnic equality would necessarily have to do away with the persistence of intergenerational 
transfers of poor schooling and labor market discrimination (Darity et al. 2001). Yet, in the 
case of African Americans, this would not go far enough. The median black family would 
have to save all wages and spend nothing for three years to close the racial wealth gap 
(Hamilton & Darity 2009). More must be done to reconcile the material wrongs of the past, 
opposed to simply removing their legal precedent for the future.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1 Geographical Distribution of Black Politicians During Reconstruction 
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Figure 2 Relationship Between County Taxes (Size) and Ratio of Sharecropping Farms to all 
Rental Farms (Shading) 
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Table 4: County Level Summary Statistics for Regression Variables  
     
  Mean   Standard Deviation  
Difference in Large Farms 1880-1870 639.8756  4634.146  
Difference in Small Farms 1880-1870 -62.28  1099.307  
Ratio of Tenant Farms to All Contract Farms 0.311  0.223  
Per Capita County Taxes 1870 1.134848  1.369978  
Number of County Black Officials 1.215986  3.813876  
Logan and Parman Segregation Measure 0.296407  0.1431204  
County Farm Values 1880 1594427  1948010  
Total Population 1870 11655.97  14987.01  
Percentage Black 0.290903  0.2423224  
Manufacturing Wages 1069926  1.95E+07  
Manufacturing Output 6857117  1.18E+08  
Urban Dummy Variable 0.035714  0.1856558  
Rail Dummy Variable 0.264503  0.4412855  
Water Dummy Variable 0.367748   0.4824296  
N 2680      
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Table 5: Complete OLS Regression Output for Change in Farms by Size 
    
     
VARIABLES 
Difference in Small Farms 
1880-1870 
Difference in Large Farms 1880-
1870  
       
Per Capita County Taxes 1870 1.051 -20.02***  
 (9.624) (7.248)  
Number of Black Officials 4.585 2.196  
 (3.254) (2.450)  
Segregation -148.1 -144.6*  
 (107.4) (80.84)  
Farm Values 1880 3.23e-05*** 9.70e-06  
 (8.35e-06) (6.29e-06)  
Total Population 1870 -0.000790 0.00314***  
 (0.00122) (0.000916)  
Percentage Black 422.6*** -164.4***  
 (68.62) (51.67)  
Manufacturing Wages -0.000119 -2.25e-05  
 (9.69e-05) (7.29e-05)  
Manufacturing Output 3.23e-05 -4.89e-05  
 (4.17e-05) (3.14e-05)  
Urban -48.12 -60.79  
 (55.15) (41.53)  
Rail 44.95* -10.27  
 (25.35) (19.09)  
Water 45.42* -52.71***  
 (24.21) (18.23)  
5.statefip -378.7*** -65.18  
 (61.41) (46.25)  
10.statefip -633.4*** -291.9**  
 (180.8) (136.2)  
12.statefip -112.3 -477.1***  
 (69.03) (51.98)  
13.statefip -167.3*** -394.9***  
 (47.27) (35.59)  
21.statefip -330.8*** -328.0***  
 (51.74) (38.96)  
22.statefip -373.6*** -376.6***  
 (61.35) (46.20)  
24.statefip -288.9*** -462.1***  
 (87.85) (66.15)  
28.statefip -364.6*** -739.5***  
 (56.95) (42.89)  
37.statefip -299.1*** -814.2***  
 (49.48) (37.26)  
45.statefip -451.0*** -802.2***  
 (67.21) (50.61)  
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47.statefip -255.7*** -855.0***  
 (51.52) (38.80)  
48.statefip -218.0*** -823.7***  
 (50.11) (37.74)  
Constant 159.4** 957.5***  
 (73.40) (55.27)  
    
Observations 693 693  
R-squared 0.278 0.677  
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table 6: Complete OLS Regression Output for Ratio of Tenant Farms to All Contract Farms 
   
  (1)  
VARIABLES Tenant Farming Ratio  
     
Per Capita County Taxes 1870 0.0131**   
(0.00543)  
Number of Black Officials 0.00282   
(0.00184)  
Segregation 0.181***   
(0.0559)  
Farm Values 1880 3.97e-09   
(4.28e-09)  
Total Population 1870 5.74e-07   
(6.41e-07)  
Percentage Black 0.411***   
(0.0357)  
Manufacturing Wages 2.86e-08   
(4.43e-08)  
Manufacturing Output 1.87e-09   
(1.63e-08)  
Urban 0.0516*   
(0.0294)  
Rail 0.0167   
(0.0134)  
Water 0.0451***   
(0.0127)  
5.statefip 0.0695*  
 (0.0355)  
10.statefip -0.162  
 (0.103)  
12.statefip 0.0943**  
 (0.0402)  
13.statefip 0.0251  
 (0.0274)  
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21.statefip 0.245***  
 (0.0296)  
22.statefip 0.0766**  
 (0.0356)  
24.statefip 0.0181  
 (0.0492)  
28.statefip 0.0406  
 (0.0332)  
37.statefip -0.0867***  
 (0.0287)  
45.statefip 0.0544  
 (0.0390)  
47.statefip 0.0766***  
 (0.0297)  
48.statefip 0.0141  
 (0.0291)  
51.statefip 0.131***  
 (0.0287)  
54.statefip 0.275***  
 (0.0362)  
Constant -0.0559  
 (0.0402)  
   
Observations 829  
R-squared 0.499  
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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